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ABSTRACT
EARNINGS SMOOTHNESS AND INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY TO STOCK
PRICES
By
XIAOCHUAN HUANG
April 26, 2011
Committee Chair: Dr. Lawrence D. Brown
Major Department: Accounting
Existing research suggests that market misvaluations affect corporate investment, often
leading to suboptimal investment. I examine whether earnings smoothness reduces the
impact of market valuations on corporate investment and in turn enhances investment
efficiency. I find that earnings smoothness has a strong negative effect on the sensitivity
of corporate investment to stock prices. Further analyses indicate that this negative effect
is driven by both innate and discretionary components of earnings smoothness and is
more pronounced for firms operating in more volatile business environments. I
complement these findings by demonstrating that firms with smoother earnings have
lower over- (under-)investment and higher future operating performance. Collectively,
the evidence suggests that earnings smoothness improves corporate investment efficiency
by reducing the impact of market valuations on investment.

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that firms are more likely to make investment when their market
values are high than when they are low.1 While the traditional interpretations of this
pattern is that firms respond to the information about investment opportunities embedded
in stock prices, recent research in behavioral corporate finance argues that stock prices do
not always reflect firm fundamentals and nonfundamental movements in stock prices
impact managers’ investing behavior.2 Researchers who take the behavioral view further
point out that managers’ responses to nonfundamentals may have detrimental effects on
real economic productivity. For example, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)
suggest that that firm-specific and market-wide misvaluations lead to an excess of
mergers, which are value destroying. If firms tend to over-invest when their stocks are
overpriced and under-invest when their stocks are underpriced (Polk and Sapienza 2009),
managers should be discouraged from undertaking investment when stock prices are high
and encouraged to undertake investment when their stock prices are low.
In this paper, I investigate how a particular accounting attribute - earnings
smoothness, affects the impact of stock prices on firm investment decisions. Recent
accounting studies have documented the effect of financial reporting on corporate
investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006, Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009,

1

This pattern can be clearly seen from Figure 1, which plots the time series of the aggregated market-tobook ratio and the aggregated corporate investment.
2
Behavioral finance research has identified two channels though which stock misvaluations may affect
corporate investment. First, mispricing affects the pattern of firm equity financing and in turn corporate
investment (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990). Second, mispricing affects investment directly when the
market misprices firms according to their level of investment, market pressure drives managers to use
investment to cater to investor demand (Polk and Sapienza 2009).

1

Francis and Martin 2010). These studies emphasize that superior financial reporting
affects corporate investment by reducing adverse selection and improving monitoring.
My study draws on the literature examining the effect of misvaluations on investment and
links earnings smoothness to corporate investment through its impact on stock prices.
I define earnings smoothness as the ratio of cash flow volatility to earnings
volatility, which captures the extent to which accrual accounting has smoothed out the
underlying volatility of the firm’s operations. I expect that earnings smoothness is
negatively associated with investment sensitivity to stock prices. The key insight
underlying this prediction is that: if a given stock price contains a greater proportion of
mispricing, then managers have greater incentives and opportunities to respond to stock
prices in their financing and investing decisions (Lamont and Stein 2006). By removing
transient earnings components and revealing permanent earnings components, earnings
smoothness reduces pricing errors caused by investors’ uncertainty about the permanence
of firm earnings (Arya, Glover, and Sunder 2003).3 If the stock prices of firms with
smoother earnings are less likely to deviate from firm fundamentals, relative to firms with
volatile earnings, firms with smooth earnings are less likely to time the market in their
equity issuance or use firm investment to cater to investor demand and maximize shortrun stock prices. As a result, investment of these firms will react less sensitively to stock
prices.
To examine the effect of earnings smoothness on the relation between corporate
investment and stock prices, I design my tests based on Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003).

3

When investors are uncertain about the permanence of firm earnings, they may misprice firm stocks by
capitalizing the transient component of earnings and interpreting the permanent component of earnings as
transient.

2

My baseline test consists of regressing investment on Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio),
future stock returns, the interaction terms between earnings smoothness and these two
proxies for stock prices, and control variables.4 As firms invest more when stock prices
are high and less when prices are low, I expect the coefficients on Q and future stock
returns to be positive and negative respectively. If earnings smoothness reduces the
impact of stock prices on investment, I expect the coefficient on the interaction between
smoothness and Q (future returns) to be negative (positive). I confirm this prediction. In
particular, firms that rank in the top tercile of earnings smoothness have investment
(proxied by asset growth) that is only roughly a third as sensitive to stock prices as firms
in the bottom tercile of earnings smoothness.
I perform several additional tests to complement the main finding that earnings
smoothness is negatively associated with investment-price sensitivity. First, I decompose
earnings smoothness into an innate component that captures a firm’s underlying business
process and a discretionary component that reflects managerial choice. I find that both
components of earnings smoothness are negatively associated with investment-price
sensitivity. Second, exploring cross-sectional variation in the effect of earnings
smoothness, I show that the negative impact of earnings smoothness on investment-price
sensitivity is greater when firms operate in more volatile and uncertain business
environments (proxied by cash flow volatility, stock return volatility, and bid-ask spread).
Third, I examine the relation between earnings smoothness and equity financing and
show that earnings smoothness is negatively associated with equity financing sensitivity
4

Using future stock returns as a proxy for stock prices follows the idea that underpriced (overpriced) stocks
tend to earn higher (lower) returns when mispricing is corrected in the future. The use of future stock
returns mitigates the concern that variation in Q contains not only mispricing but also information about
investment opportunities. I discuss competing interpretations of investment-Q sensitivity in detail in
Chapter 6.
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to stock prices. Because equity financing is a channel through which stock prices affect
investment (e.g., Bosworth 1975; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990), this evidence
corroborates the findings I obtain from the tests of investment.
The above findings collectively suggest that earnings smoothness is negatively
associated with firms’ tendency to respond to stock prices in their investment decisions.
To provide evidence on whether the negative association between earnings smoothness
and investment sensitivity to stock prices translates into more efficient investment, I
examine the relation between earnings smoothness and investment efficiency. I measure
investment efficiency as the firm’s deviation from expected investment and future
operating performance. I show that one decile increase in earnings smoothness is
associated with a reduction of over-investment (under-investment) measured by asset
growth by 0.45% (0.35%). Further, one decile in earnings smoothness is positively
associated with future operating performance measured as return on assets, operating
cash flows, and sales growth by 0.41%, 0.29%, and 0.12%, respectively.5
The results of my paper contribute to several streams of literature. My findings
add to the earnings smoothness literature by showing that earnings smoothness has a
positive impact on firms’ resource allocation. My evidence is consistent with the view
that earnings smoothness provides information rather than garbles it; and it provides
economic explanations for why firms that smooth earnings receive higher valuations
(Ghosh, Gu, and Jain 2005; Allayannis and Simko 2009), and why managers who smooth
earnings receive higher compensation (Das, Hong, and Kim 2009).

5

The mean (median) values of investment, return on assets, operating cash flows, and sales growth in my
sample are 13.83% (6.87%), 2.39% (4.03%), 8.08% (8.6%), and 11.24% (8.05%), respectively.

4

My findings complement the recent literature that studies the relation between
accounting quality and investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle,
Hilary and Verdi 2009; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Francis and Martin 2010). Biddle,
Hilary and Verdi (2009) document that firms with superior financial reporting quality
have lower over- (under)-investment. I show that the effect of accounting information on
investment-price sensitivity may be a mechanism that explains the positive relation
between accounting quality and investment efficiency. In addition, McNichols and
Stubben (2008) document that firms over-invest when managers inflate earnings and
conclude that earnings management leads to inefficient investment. Francis and Martin
(2010) conclude that timely loss recognition leads to more profitable mergers and
acquisitions as it prevents managers from investing in value destroying projects. While
these studies emphasize the governance role of earnings in affecting corporate investment,
I provide evidence that earnings may impact corporate investment through its impact on
firm valuation.
My paper extends the literature examining the relations between market
valuations and corporate financing and investing activities (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2002;
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003; Chang, Dasgupta, Hilary 2006, 2009). These studies do
not address whether market misvaluations have efficiency implications for firm
productivity. Using earnings smoothness as a common link, my study suggests that
market misvaluations may lead to suboptimal investment and that earnings smoothness
improves investment efficiency by reducing the impact of market valuations on firm
investment.

5

My paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related literature and develops
testable hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes sample selection and research design. Chapter 4
presents main empirical results. I analyze the relation between earnings smoothness and
investment efficiency in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 conducts additional tests and analyses and
Chapter 7 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Corporate investment and stock prices
Numerous studies have documented a positive relation between corporate
investment and stock prices. In the framework of market efficiency and symmetric
information, this positive relation simply reflects firms’ rational responses to the
information about investment opportunities embedded in stock prices. However, there is
much evidence that stock markets are not completely efficient and information does not
flow freely among managers and investors (e.g., Shiller 1981). In the presence of
investor irrationality and/or information asymmetry, nonfundamental movements in stock
prices impact corporate investment, often leading to suboptimal investment.
Mispricing influences firm investment in two ways.6 First, mispricing affects
corporate investment through equity financing. This idea originates from Bosworth
(1975) and Merton and Fischer (1984), who argue that managers time their equity
issuance (repurchase) when their prices are too high (low) relative to firm fundamentals.
Cash flows associated with equity financing in turn impact corporate investment (e.g.,
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990; Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers 1993; Stein 1996). In
addition, firms can undertake stock-for-stock mergers and acquisitions to take advantage
of cheap financing when their stock prices are overvalued. Second, mispricing has a
direct impact on corporate investment. When the market misprices firms according to
their level of investment, firms use investment to cater to investor sentiment to maximize

6

Figure 2 illustrates the mechanisms through which stock prices affect corporate investment and the
consequences of mispricing on corporate investment.
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short-run stock prices, that is, they invest in projects that are overpriced and cut down on
projects that are underpriced (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Polk and Sapienza 2009).7
Several studies have directly tested the implications of these two mechanisms
though which stock prices influence corporate investment. Motivated by the model in
Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) test the equity financing channel by
examining the cross-sectional variation of investment-price sensitivity associated with the
degree of equity dependence of a firm. The model predicts that relative to firms with no
debt and ample cash, equity dependent firms are more likely to forgo investment if they
have to issue undervalued stocks to fund investment projects. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003) confirm this prediction by documenting that equity-dependent firms display a
higher investment sensitivity to stock prices. They conclude that nonfundamental
components of stock prices play an important role in affecting the investment of firms
that depend on external equity capital to fund investment projects.
Polk and Sapienza (2009) emphasize the alternative “catering” channel through
which mispricing affects corporate investment. In their model, firms invest optimally
when there is no mispricing. Managers overinvest when firms are overpriced because the
market’s tendency to overvalue investment projects drives managers to forgo long-run
value to sustain short-run overvaluations. Similarly, managers invest too little when the
market is pessimistic about the value of the firm. Polk and Sapienza (2009) provide
empirical support for these predictions by documenting a positive relation between
abnormal investment and discretionary accruals (their proxy for mispricing) after
controlling for equity financing. They further show that abnormal investment is more

7

For example, in the booming market, investors may view investment as a signal of growth and overprice
firms that undertake more investment.
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sensitive to mispricing for firms with higher R&D intensity or share turnover, suggesting
that opaque firms and firms with shorter shareholder horizons are more likely to cater to
investor demand with investment.
While many studies do not address the efficiency implications of the impact of
mispricing on investment, some theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that firms’
responses to market misvaluations lead to suboptimal investment. For example,
over-investment arises when managers subsidize failing projects with the excess cash
received from selling overpriced securities (Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary 2006). Underinvestment arises when long-horizon managers refuse to issue underpriced securities to
fund profitable investment projects because issuing underpriced securities transfers
wealth from existing investors to new ones (Stein 1996). Misvaluations also lead firms to
undertake investments of poor quality. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) link
merger waves and market misvaluations, proposing that market misvaluations lead firms
to overlook the synergies between acquirers and targets and miscalibrate the quality of
mergers and acquisitions. Bowuman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) obtain empirical support
for this theoretical prediction by showing that acquisitions undertaken in booming
markets have lower long-run stock and operating performance than those undertaken in
depressed markets. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) also document that some firms
experience sharp declines in cash flows and stock returns after high industry-level market
valuations, financing, and investment.
The above discussion illustrates how misvaluations affect corporate investment
and lead to suboptimal investment. In the next section, I discuss how earnings

9

smoothness may reduce the impact of stock valuations on investment and therefore
improve investment efficiency.
2.2 Earnings smoothness
Earnings smoothness is an important attribute of earnings that has received much
attention in the accounting literature. In many studies smoothness is characterized as a
managerial choice, that is, managers move earnings from peak years to depressed years
so that the reported income stream appears less variable (Copeland 1968). Extant
literature provides two primary explanations for such income smoothing. On the one
hand, some regulators and researchers argue that earnings smoothing conceals
information (e.g., Levitt 1998; Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker 2003). According to
this garbling view, insiders smooth earnings to hide their actions and avoid interventions
by outsiders in order to facilitate private benefit extraction. For example, managers may
smooth reported income to meet the bonus target (Healy 1985) and protect their jobs
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; Arya et al. 1998). Using a cross-country design, Leuz,
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) document that managers in countries with weak investor
protection smooth earnings to mask firms’ true performance in an attempt to shield their
private control benefits.
On the other hand, some researchers suggest that earnings smoothing provides
information by revealing the permanent component of earnings and communicating
managers’ private information (e.g., Barnea, Ronen and Sadan 1975; Ronen and Sadan
1981; Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Hunt, Moyer and
Shevlin (2000) provides evidence in a U.S. setting that income smoothing enhances the
contemporaneous relation between prices and earnings. Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find

10

that the change in the current stock price of higher-smoothing firms contains more
information about their future earnings than does the change in the stock price of lowersmoothing firms, indicating earnings smoothing conveys managers’ private information.
Studies that attempt to reconcile the two opposing views point out that earnings
smoothing is generally informative in the U.S. because strong law and enforcement
mechanisms in the U.S. limit the ability of insiders to mask information and extract
private benefits. Specifically, Amiram and Owens (2010) document that discretionary
smoothness is negatively associated with cost of debt within the U.S. while it is positively

associated with cost of debt within countries that have a high threat of private benefit
extraction by insiders. This evidence is consistent with the argument that lenders
interpret earnings smoothing in the U.S. as informative and view earnings smoothing in
countries with weaker investor protection as garbling. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003)
acknowledge in their paper that “the evidence for the U.S. suggests that, on average,
managers use their discretion in a way that increases the informativeness of earnings”.
2.3 Hypotheses Development

I derive my predictions based on the evidence that earnings smoothness on
average provides information in the U.S. I posit that earnings smoothness reduces
investment sensitivity to stock prices through a reduction of mispricing. As mentioned
above, firms time equity issuance and cater to investor demand with investment when
stock prices deviate from fundamentals. Therefore, firms have greater incentives and
opportunities to respond to stock prices in their investing decisions when their stock
prices contain a greater degree of mispricing. If a given movement in stock prices of
firms with smooth earnings contains a smaller proportion of mispricing than the same-
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sized movement in stock prices of firms with volatile earnings, then investment of firms
with smooth earnings would respond less sensitively to stock prices than investment of
firms with volatile earnings.
Earnings smoothness reduces mispricing by removing transient earnings
components and revealing permanent earnings components. Actual income of the firm
varies from year to year as a result of transient shocks as well as accounting effects.
Because managers possess more information, they can better isolate transient changes
from permanent changes than can outside investors. When less well-informed investors
are uncertain about the permanence of firm earnings, they may mistakenly capitalize
transient earnings or interpret permanent earnings as transient (Arya, Glover, and Sunder
2003). Earnings smoothness conveys managers’ private information and enhances
investors’ confidence in the permanence of earnings (Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002).
Consequently, it reduces valuation errors arising from investors’ uncertainty about
earnings persistence caused by the temporal variation of earnings.
Based on the discussion above, I hypothesize that earnings smoothness reduces
the impact of stock prices on corporate investment. Specifically, my first hypothesis is:
H1: Earnings smoothness is negatively associated with investment sensitivity to
stock prices.
Having established the baseline relation between earnings smoothness and
investment sensitivity to stock prices, I now investigate innate earnings smoothness
through neutral application of accounting standards and discretionary smoothness
through intentional managerial intervention. The purpose of this investigation is two-fold.
Prior research provides mixed evidence on the informativeness of innate versus

12

discretionary earnings smoothness (e.g., Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Jayaraman 2008).8
Therefore, it is important to document the effect of discretionary earnings smoothness
because we are interested in what actions firms can take to affect earnings quality and in
turn improve investment efficiency. In addition, as detailed in Chapter 6, the evidence on
the effect of innate smoothness on investment-price sensitivity helps to address the
concern that managerial attributes rather than earnings smoothness per se explain the
results documented in this study. Based on the argument that both innate and
discretionary components of earnings smoothness remove the transient component of
earnings and drive prices closer to firm fundamentals, I predict that both components
reduce investment sensitivity to stock prices. My second set of hypotheses is:
H2a: Innate earnings smoothness is negatively associated with investment
sensitivity to stock prices.
H2b: Discretionary earnings smoothness is negatively associated with investment
sensitivity to stock prices.
The impact of earnings smoothness on investment-price sensitivity is likely to
vary with firms’ business environments. When firms operate in volatile and uncertain
business environments, valuation uncertainty is also likely to be high. The marginal
benefit of earnings smoothness should be higher for these firms. Consistent with this
argument, Jayaraman (2008) documents that earnings smoothing is more informative
when firms experience extreme performance. Therefore, I expect that the effect of
earnings smoothness in reducing the impact of stock prices on investment is greater for
firms operating in more volatile business environments. My third hypothesis is:

8

For example, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find that discretionary earnings smoothness provides
information. In contrast, Jayaraman (2008) and LaFond, Lang, and Skaife (2007) conclude that while
innate earnings smoothness provides information, discretionary earnings smoothness garbles information.
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H3: The negative effect of earnings smoothness on investment sensitivity to stock
prices is greater for firms that operate in more volatile business
environments.
Finally, I examine the relation between earnings smoothness and equity financing
sensitivity to stock prices. Because equity financing is a channel through which stock
valuations affect investment (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990; Stein 1996), the test
of the impact of earnings smoothness on equity financing is a complement to the
hypotheses that I develop for investment. Firms are less likely to time the market in their
equity issuance when their stock prices tend to reflect firm fundamentals. Because
earnings smoothness facilitates stock prices to converge on fundamentals, it reduces
equity financing sensitivity to stock prices. My fourth hypothesis is:
H4: Earnings smoothness is negatively associated with equity financing
sensitivity to stock prices.

14

CHAPTER 3
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Data selection
My main sample consists of firms listed on the Compustat Annual Fundamental
Files during 1993-2006. I start my sample in 1993 because I need cash flow statement
data to reliably estimate earnings smoothness over the five years t-1 to t-5 and cash flow
statements are not widely available until 1988. 9 I stop at 2006 because I require future
three-year stock return and operating performance data for my tests. I obtain stock return
data from CRSP. Following common practice in prior research, I exclude the financial
and real estate industries (SIC codes in the 6000 to 6999 range) and the regulated utilities
industry (SIC code 4200) because the investment and financing polices of firms in these
industries are likely to be significantly different from firms in other industries. I exclude
firm-year observations with less than $10 million book value of equity to ensure that my
results are not driven by extremely small companies. I winsorize all continuous variables
at the 1% and 99% levels by year to mitigate the influence of extreme outliers. My final
main sample consists of 32,234 firm-year observations.
3.2 Measure of earnings smoothness
I use the ratio of cash flow volatility to earnings volatility to measure earnings
smoothness (SMTH). This measure captures the extent to which accrual accounting has
smoothed out the underlying volatility of the firm’s operations, which is consistent with
prior research on earnings smoothness (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Francis,
LaFond, Ohlson, and Schipper 2004; Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2008;
9

Collins and Hribar (2002) suggest that accruals estimated from the balance sheet as opposed to the cash
flow statement contain measurement error and may lead to biased inferences.
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McInnis 2010). Cash flow (earnings) volatility is the standard deviation of cash flows
from operations (earnings before extraordinary items) scaled by the average total assets
estimated at the annual level over the five years t-5 to t-1 with a minimum of four year
data. Detailed definitions of all the variables used in this study are provided in the
Appendix. Large values of SMTH indicate greater earnings smoothness. I report the raw
values of SMTH in descriptive statistics. I use the decile ranking of SMTH by year in the
regression analyses to address the concern of non-normality and to simplify the economic
interpretation of regression coefficients.
3.3 Empirical models for hypotheses testing
To test whether earnings smoothness affects the impact of stock prices on
investment, I focus on the cross-sectional variation in the partial correlations between
investment and stock prices associated with earnings smoothness. Consistent with prior
research (e.g., Baker, Stein and Wurgler 2003, Lamont and Stein 2006), I use both
Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) and future realized stock returns to proxy for stock
prices. High Q indicates a greater likelihood of current overpricing while high future
returns indicate a greater likelihood of current underpricing as firms earn higher returns
when current underpricing is corrected in the future. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 6,
Q embodies the information about future investment opportunities and therefore results
on Q are subject to the alternative interpretation given by the traditional view on the
relation between stock prices and investment. The use of future stock returns addresses
this concern as future stock returns should not reflect the information about firm future
profitability.

16

3.3.1 Test of basic effect of earnings smoothness (H1)
I test the effect of earnings smoothness on investment sensitivity to stock prices in
two ways. First, I estimate the following equations separately for the three subsamples
formed by terciles of earnings smoothness:
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2CFi,t + β3LogAsseti,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum
+ εi,t

(1)

INVESTi,t = α + β1RETi,t+3 + β2CFi,t + β3LogAsseti,t -1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum (2)
+ εi,t
where INVEST is firm i’s investment, measured as the percentage change in book value
of assets from year t-1 to t. I use change in assets (asset growth) because Cooper, Gulen,
and Schill (2008) argue that it is a more comprehensive measure of firm-level real
investment and disinvestment than other investment measures used in prior research.10 Q
is measured as the market value of assets (the market value of equity plus the book value
of liabilities) divided by the book value of assets at the beginning of year t. RET is
measured as the cumulative raw returns over the three years t+1, t+2, and t+3. The
choice of three years is based on the evidence that mispricing associated with external
financing is likely to unravel over this horizon (Loughran and Ritter 1999; Baker and
Wurgler 2000).11
Other variables are included as controls. Cash flow (CF) is included to control
for the effect of internal financing on investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988).
I measure CF as the sum of net income before extraordinary items, depreciation and

10

Using asset growth to measure investment is consistent with Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Chen,
Goldstein and Wei (2007). I discuss the robustness of the results to alternative measures of investment in
Chapter 6.
11
I obtain similar results when I use market-adjusted returns.
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amortization expense, and R&D expense scaled by lagged assets.12 LogAsset is included
to control for firm size and to mitigate the concern of spurious correlation as INVEST is
scaled by lagged assets. I include year and two-digit SIC industry dummy variables to
control for year and industry effects on firm investment.
Consistent with the market mispricing argument that firms invest more (less)
when their stocks are overpriced (underpriced), I expect INVEST to be positively
associated with Q and negatively associated with RET. According to H1, which predicts
that earnings smoothness reduces investment sensitivity to stock prices, I expect the
positive coefficients on Q to decrease across SMTH terciles and the negative coefficients
on RET to increase across SMTH terciles.
Second, I expand the above basic framework by including both Q and RET and
the interaction terms between SMTH and these two proxies for stock prices in the same
regression below. This is a more rigorous test because RET will only attract a significant
coefficient when it contains incremental information over Q.
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3RETi,t+3 + β4SMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 +
β5CFi,t + β6LogAsseti,t-1 + β7SMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t (3)
The interaction between SMTH and Q (RET) captures the effect of earnings smoothness
on investment sensitivity to stock prices. SMTH is included separately to control for its
direct effect on investment. I expect a significant negative coefficient on SMTH*Q (β2 <0)
and a significant positive coefficient on SMTH*RET (β4 >0).

12

I use this CF measure to be consistent with Chen, Goldstein, and Wei (2007). The inferences remain
unchanged when I use cash flows from operations to proxy for internal financing.
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3.3.2 Test of effect of innate and discretionary earnings smoothness (H2)
I first decompose earnings smoothness into its innate and discretionary
components by regressing total earnings smoothness on innate determinants of earnings
quality as described in Dechow and Dichev (2002). I estimate the following equation by
year and two-digit SIC industry:
SMTHi,t-1 = α + β1LogAsseti,t-1 + β2STDCFOi,t-1 + β3STDSALES i,t-1 +
β4OperatingCylesi,t-1 + β5Lossi,t-1 + εi,t-1

(4)

where STDCFO (STDSALES) is the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) measured
over the five years t-5 to t-1, OperatingCyles is the log of the firm’s operating cycles, and
Loss is the number of years in which the firm reported negative earnings over the five
years t-5 to t-1. I use the predicted values from the equation above to proxy for innate
earnings smoothness (ISMTH) and the residuals to proxy for discretionary earnings
smoothness (DSMTH).13
I estimate the effect of innate and discretionary earnings smoothness on
investment sensitivity to stock prices using the following regression:
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2ISMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3DSMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β4RETi,t+3
+ β5ISMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β6DSMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β7CFi,t + β8LogAsseti,t-1
+ β9ISMTHi,t-1 + β10DSMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
(5)
Consistent with H2, which predicts that both innate and discretionary earnings
smoothness reduce investment sensitivity to stock prices, I expect significant negative
coefficients on ISMTH*Q (β2<0) and DSMTH*Q (β3<0) and significant positive
coefficients on ISMTH*RET (β5 >0) and DSMTH*RET (β6 >0).
3.3.3 Test of cross-sectional variation in the effect of earnings smoothness (H3)
I use Equation (6) to test whether the effect of earnings smoothness on investment
13

DSMTH and ISMTH are ranked into deciles by year before they enter Equation (5).
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sensitivity to stock prices is more pronounced when firms operate in more volatile
business environments.
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2HIGHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β4SMTHi,t-1
*HIGHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β5RETi,t+3 + β6HIGHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β7SMTH*RETi,t+3 +
β8SMTHi,t-1*HIGHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β9CFi,t + β10LogAsseti,t-1 + β11SMTHi,t-1 +
β12HIGHi,t-1 + β13SMTHi,t-1*HIGHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t (6)
where HIGH is an indicator variable coded as one if the corresponding proxy for the
uncertainty/volatility of business environments is above the median in year t-1, and zero
otherwise. Consistent with Francis and Martin (2010), I alternatively use cash flow
volatility (STDCFO), stock return volatility (STDRET), and bid-ask spread (SPREAD) to
proxy for the uncertainty of a firm’s operating environment. STDCFO is defined in
equation (4). STDRET is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in year t-1.
SPREAD is the average daily bid-ask spread in year t-1, measured as the difference
between ask and bid prices divided by the average of bid and ask prices.
The coefficients on SMTH*HIGH*Q and SMTH*HIGH*RET indicate the
incremental effect of earnings smoothness in mitigating investment-price sensitivity
when firms’ business environments are more volatile. I expect a significant negative
coefficient on SMTH*HIGH*Q (β4 <0) and a significant positive coefficient on
SMTH*HIGH*RET (β8 >0).
3.3.4 Test of earnings smoothness and equity financing sensitivity to stock prices (H4)
I examine whether earnings smoothness affects equity financing sensitivity to
stock prices by replacing the dependent variable in equation (3) with proxies for
financing.
ISUi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3RETi,t+3 + β4SMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 +
β5CFi,t + β6LogAsseti,t-1 + β7SMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t (7)
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where ISU is capital raised from external financing by firm i in year t. Although my
primary focus is equity financing, I present both equity financing (EISU) and debt
financing (DISU). A comparison of differential equity and debt financing sensitivity to
stock prices helps to shed a light on the argument that firms respond to stock market
misvaluations. I provide detailed discussions regarding this comparison in Chapters 4.2.4
and 6. Following Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006), I measure external financing
using cash flow statement data. EISU is the net cash proceeds from the issuance and/or
purchase of common and preferred stock less cash dividends paid. DISU is the net cash
proceeds from the issuance and/or repayment of debt. I scale EISU and DISU by lagged
assets to measure the amount of capital raised relative to the existing asset base.
Consistent with H4 that earnings smoothness reduces equity financing sensitivity
to stock prices, I expect a significant negative coefficient on SMTH*Q (β2 <0) and a
significant positive coefficient on SMTH*RET (β4 >0).
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample used for testing
hypotheses H1 - H4. INVEST has a mean of 13.83% and a median of 6.87%, suggesting
that firms invest and grow on average. Mean values for EISU and DISU are 0.87% and
2.06% respectively, indicating an overall tendency for firms to raise additional external
capital. However, the medians of external financing proxies are all close to zero. SMTH
has a mean of 1.9 and a median of 1.26, revealing that on average a firm’s cash flow
volatility exceeds its earnings volatility, consistent with the role of accruals to smooth out
transitory components of earnings (Dechow 1994). The mean (median) value of Q is
1.86 (1.4) and the mean (median) of RET is 0.44 (0.41). These descriptive statistics are
consistent with those reported in prior research (Francis, LaFond, Ohlson, and Schipper
2004; Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2006).
Panel B of Table 1 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations among these
variables. INVEST and proxies for external financing (EISU and DISU) are positively
correlated, suggesting that firms raise external capital to finance investment projects. As
expected, INVEST is positively correlated with Q and negatively correlated with RET.
Moreover, INVEST is positively correlated with CF and negatively correlated with
LogAsset. SMTH is positively correlated with STDCFO, consistent with the innate
smoothness role of accruals documented in Dechow and Dichev (2002). Finally, SMTH
is negatively correlated with STDRET and SPREAD.
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4.2 Regression results
4.2.1 Results for H1
Figure 3 presents the investment sensitivity to stock prices across earnings
smoothness terciles from low to high. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates of
investment sensitivity to Q from Equation (1) and Panel B reports the coefficient
estimates of investment sensitivity to RET from Equation (2). Specifically, moving from
low to high SMTH, the coefficient estimates on Q decrease from 6.463 to 2.236 (with a
coefficient of 5.215 for the medium group) while the coefficient estimates on RET
increase from -5.231 to -2.295 (with a coefficient of -4.238 for the medium group). This
pattern of results suggests that earnings smoothness reduces investment sensitivity to
stock prices.
Table 2 reports the results for H1 when both SMTH and RET are included in the
same regression. Column 1 estimates the baseline regression without the interaction
terms between SMTH and Q (RET). It shows that INVEST is positively (negatively)
related to Q (RET) with the coefficient of 4.892 (-3.430), significant at less than 1% level.
Table 1 Panel A indicates that the standard deviation of Q (RET) is 1.41 (0.81). Thus one
standard deviation in Q changes INVEST by 6.89% (1.41*4.892 = 6.90) while one
standard deviation in RET changes INVEST by 2.78% (0.81*3.430 = 2.78).
Column 2 reports the results of Equation (3). The coefficient on SMTH*Q is
significantly negative (β2 = -0.429, t = 4.67) and the coefficient on SMTH*RET is
significantly positive (β4 = 0.292, t = 3.44). Given that unconditional investment
sensitivity to Q from Column 1 is 4.892, the coefficient on SMTH*Q shows that one
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decile increase in SMTH results in about an 8.8% (0.429/4.892) decrease of positive
investment sensitivity to Q. Similarly, one decile increase in SMTH is associated with
about an 8.5% (0.292/3.430) decrease of negative investment sensitivity to RET.
Turning to control variables, both Columns 1 and 2 show a positive significant
coefficient on CF, confirming the evidence in the prior literature that investment is
positively related to internal financing (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988). The
coefficients on LogAsset are significantly negative, suggesting that large firms have less
growth potential and invest less. The overall evidence in Figure 2 and Table 2 is
consistent with H1 that earnings smoothness reduces investment sensitivity to stock
prices.
4.2.2 Results for H2
Table 3 reports the regression results for H2. Column 1 presents the baseline
regression results. It indicates a positive coefficient on Q (4.904) and a negative
coefficient on RET (-3.435). It also shows that ISMTH is not significantly related to
INVEST while DSMTH is significantly positively related to INVEST. Column 2 reports
the results of Equation (5). The coefficients on DSMTH*Q (β2 = -0.684, t = -6.49) and
ISMTH*Q (β3 = -0.124, t = -1.35) are both negative although the latter is not statistically
significant. The coefficients on ISMTH*RET (β5 = 0.166, t = 1.92) and DSMTH*RET (β6
= 0.278, t = 3.23) are both significantly positive.14 These results are generally consistent

14

Given that my primary interest is whether each component of earnings smoothness drives the results and
I do not have a prior to predict which component prevails, I do not compare the magnitudes of the effects
associated with innate and discretionary smoothness.
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with H2, which predicts that both innate and discretionary components of earnings
smoothness reduces investment sensitivity to stock prices.15
4.2.3 Results for H3
Table 4 reports the regression results of Equation (6). Columns 1, 2, and 3 report
the results when the proxy for the uncertainty of the business environment is STDCFO,
STDRET, and SPREAD, respectively. The coefficients on HIGH*Q (HIGH*RET) are
significantly positive (negative) across all three columns, indicating that firms are more
likely to respond to stock prices when they operate in more uncertain business
environments. None of the coefficients on SMTH*Q and SMTH*RET are significant,
indicating that earnings smoothness does not significantly reduce investment sensitivity
to stock prices when the uncertainty of business environments is low. The coefficients on
SMTH*HIGH*Q (SMTH*HIGH*RET) are negative (positive) in all three columns and
significant in Columns 1 and 3. These results are generally consistent with H3, which
predicts that the negative effect of earnings smoothness on investment-price sensitivity is
stronger when firms’ business environments are more volatile.
4.2.4 Results for H4
Table 5 reports the results for H4. Columns 1 and 3 estimate the baseline
regressions with EISU and DISU as the independent variable, respectively. Columns 1
and 3 show that the magnitudes of the coefficients on Q and RET are greater for EISU
than for DISU (2.085 versus 0.685; -0.907 versus -0.637), although the distributions of
DISU and EISU (as shown in Panel A of Table 1) indicate that on average firms issue
15

When the coefficients on the interactions between earnings smoothness and RET are statistically
significant, I conclude that the results are generally consistent with my hypotheses even though the
coefficients on the interactions between earnings smoothness and Q are not statistically significant. I use
the same criterion to interpret the results for H3. This is because unlike Tobin’s Q, RET is not subject to the
concern that it contains information about investment opportunities.
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more debt than equity. This combined evidence suggests that equity financing is more
sensitive to stock prices than debt financing, consistent with the view that stock market
misvaluations affect equity issuance and repurchases.
Columns 2 and 4 report the results of Equation (7) with EISU and DISU as the
independent variable, respectively. Column 2 shows a negative coefficient on SMTH*Q
(β2 = -0.251, t = -4.54) and a positive coefficient on SMTH*RET (β4 = 0.087, t = 2.54),
which is consistent with H4 that earnings smoothness reduces equity financing sensitivity
to stock prices. More specifically, one decile increase in SMTH reduces the average
equity financing sensitivity to Q (2.085 from Column 1) by 12% (0.251/2.085) and
reduces the average equity financing sensitivity to RET (-0.907 from Column 1) by 9.6%
(0.087/0.907). Column 4 shows a negative coefficient on SMTH*Q (β2 = -0.049, t = 2.11) and a positive but insignificant coefficient on SMTH*RET (β4 = 0.019, t = 0.65). In
particular, one decile increase in SMTH reduces the average debt financing sensitivity to
Q (0.685 from Column 3) by 7.2% (0.049/0.685) and reduces the average debt financing
sensitivity to RET (-0.637 from Column 3) by 3.0% (0.019/0.637). These results suggest
that earnings smoothness has a stronger negative effect on equity financing sensitivity to
stock prices than on debt financing sensitivity to stock prices.
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CHAPTER 5
INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
To validate my prediction that earnings smoothness reduces the impact of market
misvaluations on corporate investment, which in turn leads to more efficient investment,
in this section I examine the relation between earnings smoothness and investment
efficiency. I focus on a firm’s likelihood to deviate from expected investment predicted
by its sales growth and its average operating performance in the three years subsequent to
the year in which I measure investment. These two tests complement each other for the
following reasons. Examining a firm’s deviation from expected investment provides a
direct test of the prediction that mangers over-invest (under-invest) when market
valuations are high (low). However, this test critically depends on the assumption that
sales growth is a good proxy for investment opportunities. Examining future operating
performance mitigates the model specification concern. However, any observed relation
between earnings smoothness and operating performance may be caused by unknown
factors that are related to earnings smoothness but unrelated to firm investment decisions.
5.1 Over- and under-investment
To measure over- and under-investment, I estimate the following piece-wise
linear model of investment as a function of sales growth for two-digit SIC industry in
each year and use the residuals as proxies for deviations from expected investment.16
INVESTi,t = α0 + β1SGi,t-1 + β2NEGi,t-1 + β3SG*NEGi,t-1 + εi,t

16

(8)

Using sales growth to proxy for investment opportunities is consistent with Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi
(2009). I estimate a piece-wise linear regression because the relation between investment and sales growth
could differ between sales contractions and sales expansions (e.g., McNichols and Stubben 2008; Chen,
Hope, Li, and Wang 2010).

27

where SG is the annual sales growth for firm i in year t-1. NEG is an indicator variable
taking the value of one for sales decreases, and zero otherwise.
I then examine the relation between earnings smoothness and over- and underinvestment by estimating the following equation.17
OINVEST (UINVEST)i,t = α + β1SMTHi,t-1 + β2LogAsseti,t-1 + β3Slacki,t-1 +
β4Leveragei,t-1 + β5Tangibilityi,t-1 + β6K-structurei,t-1 + β7Dividendi,t-1 +
β8Agei,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
(9)
where OINVEST is the positive residuals from equation (9) and UINVEST is the negative
residuals multiplied by minus one for ease of interpretation. To mitigate the concern of
endogeneity, I measure all independent variables at the beginning of year t. Following
Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I control for a set of firm characteristics that may affect
corporate investment. LogAsset is the log value of book assets. Slack is the ratio of cash
balance to property, plant, and equipment. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. KStructure is the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of the long-term debt and the market
value of equity. Dividend is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm pays
a dividend, and zero otherwise. Age is the number of years since the firm first appeared
on CRSP.18 These variables control for firm size, internal financing capability, financial
constraints, asset pledgeability, debt overhang problem, and firm maturity, respectively.
17

In this model all firms in my sample are classified as either over-investing or under-investing. To relax
the restriction that all firms deviate from optimal investment, I apply a multi-nominal logistic regression
used in Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009). I sort firms into quartiles each year based on the residuals from
equation (8). Firm-year observations in the top (bottom) quartile are classified as the over-investing
(under-investing) group and those in the middle quartiles as the normal investing group. Thus the
multinomial logistic regression tests how earnings smoothness affects the probability of a firm falling into
the suboptimal investing groups versus the normal investing group. Untabulated results indicate that using
the logistic model does not affect my inferences.
18
I do not include Q and CF as control variables because they are used to test investment sensitivity to
stock prices. Untabulated results indicate that including these variables does not affect my conclusion.
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Table 6 reports the regression results for tests of over-investment (Columns 1 and
2) and under-investment (Columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 present the univariate
results while Columns 2 and 4 present the multivariate results with the control variables
included. The coefficient estimates on SMTH in Columns 1 and 2 are -0.613 (t = -6.24)
and -0.450 (t = -4.64), respectively. The coefficient estimates on SMTH in Columns 3
and 4 are -0.439 (t = -14.79) and -0.350 (t = -12.19), respectively. These coefficients
indicate the percentage change of OINVEST and UINVEST associated with one decile
increase of SMTH. When compared with the mean and median values of INVEST (13.83%
and 6.87%, respectively) in Table 1 Panel A, these effects appear economically
significant.
5.2 Subsequent operating performance
I test the relation between earnings smoothness and firm future operating
performance by estimating the following equation.
Performancei,t+3 = α + β1SMTHi,t-1 + β2Salesi,t-1 + β3Qi,t-1 + β4LogAsseti,t-1 + β5Agei,t-1
+ β6Leveragei,t-1 + β7Hindexi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t+3
(10)
where Performance is the average firm operating performance over the three years t+1,
t+2, and t+3. I consider performance measures based on earnings, cash flows, and sales.
Specifically, I use return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), cash flows from
operations (CFO), asset turnover (ATO) and sales growth (SG). Control variables are
mainly adopted from Chen, Goldstein, and Wei (2007). Sales and LogAsset are included
to proxy for firm size because Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that larger firms
have higher future operating performance. Age is included to control for firm maturity.
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Hindex is the Herfindahl index based on sales and is included to control for the effect of
product market competition on firm profitability.
I use these three sets of performance metrics to complement each other because
they each have their unique strengths and weaknesses. The positive relation between
SMTH and ROA could be mechanical, simply reflecting inter-temporal shifting of
accruals as opposed to the economic consequences of more efficient investment. CFO is
less likely subject to the same concern. However, CFO is not a timely performance
metric and does not match well with underlying economic activities (Dechow 1994).19
Sales-based measures are reliable in the sense that revenues are less likely to be
manipulated than expenses (Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen 2003; Jegadeesh and
Livnat 2006).
Table 7 reports the regression results for the test of operating performance. When
future performance is measured as ROA, ROE, CFO, ATO, and SG, the coefficient on
SMTH is 0.405, 0.945, 0.292, 0.362, and 0.116, respectively, which represent the
percentage increases of corresponding operating performance associated with one decile
increase of SMTH. Untabulated results show that the mean (median) values of these
performance measures in my sample are 2.39% (4.03%) , 2% (8.8%), 8.08% (8.6%),
120.29% (104.63%) and 11.24% (8.05%), respectively. Therefore, the effect of earnings
smoothness on future operating performance appears economically significant.

19

For example, negative CFO can result from investment in positive net present value projects if
disproportionately large amounts of cash flows are received at the later stages of the investment. This is
especially true for relatively young firms.
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CHAPTER 6
ADDITIONAL TESTS AND ANALYSES
6.1 Alternative measures of corporate investment
In the above main analyses, I use asset growth as a proxy for corporate investment
as it captures comprehensive firm investment and disinvestment (Cooper, Gulen, and
Schill 2008). To perform a robustness check, I use three alternative measures of
corporate investment - INVESTALT, CAPXRND, and CAPEX. INVESTALT is the sum of
capital expenditure, research and development cost, and acquisition expenditure less cash
receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment as in Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi
(2009). Unlike asset growth that includes stock acquisition, this measure of investment
includes only cash acquisitions as reported in the statement of cash flows. CAPXRND is
the sum of capital expenditure and research and development cost and CAPX is capital
expenditure only. Results in Table 8 indicate that, when using INVESTALT or
CAPXRND as the dependent variable, the coefficients on SMTH*Q remain significant
and positive and the coefficients on SMTH*RET are not significant. Further, as reported
in the last column of Table 8, earnings smoothness does not affect the relation between
stock prices and capital expenditure (CAPX). These results suggest that the effect of
earnings smoothness on investment-price sensitivity is stronger when asset growth is
used as investment proxy or when stock acquisitions and research and development
expenses are included in the calculation of corporate investment. The findings are
consistent with the prior studies documenting that stock acquisition and hard-to-value
investment, such as R&D, are the key elements in the relation between stock valuations
and corporate investment because firms tend to undertake stock acquisitions rather than
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cash acquisitions when firms are overvalued and use hard-to-value investment to cater to
investor sentiment and maximize short-run stock prices.
6.2 Abnormal investment sensitivity to stock prices
Prior research suggests that firms overinvest when stocks are overvalued and
underinvest when stocks are undervalued (Polk and Sapienza 2009). In the main analyses,
I perform two sets of tests – the relation between earnings smoothness and investmentprice sensitivity and the relation between earnings smoothness and investment efficiency.
My combined evidence from these two sets of analyses suggests that earnings
smoothness reduces over-investment when stock prices are high and under-investment
when prices are low. To test this hypothesis more directly, I replace the dependent
variable in Equation (3) with measures of over-investment (OINVEST) and underinvestment (UINVEST). As reported in Table 9, when OINVEST is used as the dependent
variable, the coefficient on SMTH*Q is significant and negative (-0.312, t = -3.56),
indicating earnings smoothness reduces over-investment when stock prices are high. The
coefficient on SMTH*RET is significant and positive (0.275, t =1.78), indicating earnings
smoothness increases over-investment when stock prices are low. When UINVEST is
used as the dependent variable, the coefficient on SMTH*Q is not significant (0.005, t =
0.13) and the coefficient on SMTH*RET is significant and negative (-0.100, t = 2.18),
suggesting that earnings smoothness does not affect under-investment when stock prices
are high and reduces under-investment when stock prices are low. These results
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generally are consistent with the argument that earnings smoothness reduces overinvestment when stock prices are high and under-investment when they are low.20
6.3 Alternative interpretations of investment sensitivity to Q
Variation in Q comes from three sources – mispricing, information about
investment profitability, and measurement error (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 2003). My
theory emphasizes that earnings smoothness reduces the impact of mispricing on firm
investment. Therefore the other two components in Q can create alternative
interpretations for my results.
I address the concern that firms with smoother earnings have a lower investment
sensitivity to Q because there is less information about investment opportunities in Q for
these firms. 21 First, as pointed out by Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), using future
stock returns, which reflect managers’ views about over- and under-valuations, helps to
mitigate this concern. In the framework of market efficiency, future stock returns should
not contain the information about investment opportunities embedded in Q.22 Second,
the analyses related to H4 show that equity financing is more sensitive to stock prices
than debt financing and earnings smoothness has a stronger negative effect on equity than
on debt financing sensitivity to stock prices. These results are consistent with the
conjecture that firms react to stock market misvaluations by exploiting time-varying cost
of equity. Finally, if the negative association between earnings smoothness and
20

I do not use OINVEST and UINVEST as dependent variables in my main analysis as the validity of these
abnormal investment measures depend critically on the assumption that sales growth is a good measure of
investment opportunities.
21
The information hypothesis states that firms react less strongly to stock prices when prices contain less
information about firm fundamentals that managers do not have. Consistent with this conjecture, Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) document a positive relation between price informativeness (proxied by price
nonsynchronicty and PIN) and investment sensitivity to stock prices.
22
Using future stock return also helps to discriminate between the interpretations given by the mispricing
hypothesis and those given by the adverse-selection models set in an efficient market (Myers and Majluf
1984).
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investment sensitivity to stock prices reflects less information in stock prices about firm
fundamentals for firms with smoother earnings, I should observe a negative rather than a
positive relation between earnings smoothness and firm future operating performance.
Measurement error may also drive the negative relation between earnings
smoothness and investment sensitivity to Q if earnings smoothness is positively related to
measurement error in Q. Prior research shows that measurement error in Q is greater for
young, growing, and low-dividend firms (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988;
Erickson and Whited 2000). However, in my sample, firms with smoother earnings tend
to be mature, large, and dividend-paying firms.23 Therefore, measurement error is
unlikely to drive my results. Another possible threat is that the relation between
investment and Q is concave. That is, investment sensitivity to Q is higher when Q is low
than when Q is high. The negative correlation between SMTH and Q (shown in Table 1
Panel B) suggests that the possible concave relation between Q and investment would
bias my results away from showing a negative relation between earnings smoothness and
investment sensitivity to Q.
6.4 Control for capital constraints
I document that earnings smoothness has a negative effect on investment
sensitivity to stock prices. Baker, Wurgler and Stein (2003) show that capital constraints
have a positive effect on investment sensitivity to stock prices. To assess the sensitivity
of my results to firms’ capital constraints, I include the Kaplan-Zingales index (measured
as a function of cash flow, cash dividends, cash balance, and leverage) in my

23

Untabulated results show that earnings smoothness is significantly positively correlated with Age,
LogAsset, and Dividend (Pearson correlations of 0.13, 0.10, and 0.08, respectively).
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regressions.24 Consistent with Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), I find a positive relation
between the Kaplan-Zingales index and investment sensitivity to Q. However, the
negative relation between earnings smoothness and investment sensitivity to stock prices
is unchanged.
6.5 Managerial attributes
Arguably, managers who smooth earnings have greater propensities to smooth
investment, resulting in a less prompt response to stock prices and less volatile
investment. Similarly, managers who smooth earnings have higher ability because only
capable mangers have superior knowledge about firm future performance and are able to
smooth earnings (Spence 1973). Therefore, the observed negative relation between
earnings smoothness and investment sensitivity to stock prices may simply be driven by
managers’ preferences or ability rather than by earnings smoothness per se. The evidence
that innate earnings smoothness reduces investment sensitivity to stock prices helps rule
out managerial preferences as the sole driver for my findings.

24

The Pearson and Spearman correlations between SMTH and KZ index are -0.01 and -0.05, respectively.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the effect of earnings smoothness on corporate investment
sensitivity to stock prices. I find that earnings smoothness is negatively associated with
investment sensitivity to stock prices. That is, relative to firms with volatile earnings,
firms with smoother earnings are less likely to invest more(less) when stock prices are
high (low). In addition, I document that both innate and discretionary components of
earnings smoothness are negatively associated with investment sensitivity to stock prices.
Exploring cross-sectional variation in the effect of earnings smoothness, I show that the
negative impact of earnings smoothness on investment-price sensitivity is greater when
firms operate in more volatile or more uncertain business environments. Finally, I
demonstrate that earnings smoothness has a negative effect on equity financing
sensitivity to stock prices.
To determine whether the effect of earnings smoothness on investment-price
sensitivity translates into more efficient investment, I examine the relation between
earnings smoothness and investment efficiency. The results reveal that earnings
smoothness reduces a firm’s over- (under)-investment and increases its future operating
performance. Collectively, these results suggest that earnings smoothness reduces the
volatility of investment introduced by non-fundamental movements in stock prices,
leading to more efficient corporate investment.
The main interpretation of the results is consistent with Lamont and Stein’s (2006)
prediction that corporate investment and issuance should respond less strongly to stock
prices that contain a smaller proportion of nonfundamentals. An alternative interpretation
is that the lower investment-price sensitivity associated with smoothing firms reflects less
36

information about investment opportunities embedded in stock prices for these firms.
However, this alternative interpretation is inconsistent with the previous findings
suggesting that earnings smoothing provides information in the U.S. setting (e.g., Tucker
and Zarowin). Regardless, my results provide an empirical regularity that associates
firms’ earnings properties with the relation between corporate investment and stock
prices.
My paper focuses on the average effect of earnings smoothness on investmentprice sensitivity. Future research could examine the effect of earnings smoothing in
settings where managers smooth earnings to convey private information versus settings
where mangers smooth earnings to mask underlying operations. My study uses asset
growth as a general measure of firm investment. Future research could study the effect of
earnings smoothness in more specific contexts, such as firms’ decisions to undertake
mergers and acquisitions. Finally, future research could examine how other earnings
attribute measures, such as timely loss recognition, impact the relation between stock
prices and corporate investment.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions
Investment measures:
INVEST:

Change in assets (data6) scaled by lagged assets (%).

INVESTALT:

The sum of capital expenditure (data128), research and development
expenditure (data46), and acquisition expenditure (data129) less cash
receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment (data107) scaled
by lagged total assets (data6) (%).

CPAXRND:

The sum of capital expenditure (data128) and research and
development expenditure (item 46) multiplied by 100 and scaled by
lagged total assets (item 6).

CAPX:

Capital expenditure (item 128) multiplied by 100 and scaled by
lagged total assets (item 6).

External financing measures:
EISU:

Equity issuance, measured as the net cash proceeds from the issuance
and/or purchase of common and preferred stock less cash dividends
paid (data108-data115-data127) scaled by lagged assets (data6).

DISU:

Debt issuance, measured as the net cash proceeds from the issuance
and/or repayment of debt (data111-data114+data301) scaled by
lagged assets (data6).

Earnings smoothness measures:
SMTH:

The standard deviation of cash flows (data308) scaled by total assets
(data6) divided by standard deviation of earnings (data18) scaled by
total assets (data6) over the five years t-5 to t-1.

ISMTH:

Innate component of earnings smoothness measured as the predicted
value from the regression below.

DSMTH:

Discretionary component of earning smoothness measured as the
residuals from the following regression.
SMTHi,t = α0 + β1LogAsseti,t + β2STDCFOi,t + β3STDSALES i,t-1
+ β4OperatingCylei,t + β5Lossi,t + εi,t
The above equation is estimated on all firms in the same industry
(two-digit SIC) each year. Independent variables are defined in the
“firm innate attributes” section listed below.
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Firm innate attributes:
LogAsset:

The log of total assets (data6).

STDSALES:

The standard deviation of sales (data12) deflated by total assets
(data6) over the five years t-5 to t-1.

STDCFO:

The standard deviation of cash flows (data308) scaled by total assets
(data6) over the five years t-5 to t-1.

OperatingCycle: The log of receivables to sales (data2/data12) plus inventory to cost
of goods sold (data3/data41) multiplied by 360.
Loss:

The number of years over the five years t-5 to t-1 in which the firm’s
net income before extraordinary item (data18) is negative.

Inherent information asymmetry proxies:
STDCFO:

The same as STDCFO described above.

STDRET:

The standard deviation of daily stock returns.

SPREAD:

The average daily bid-ask spread, measured as the difference
between ask and bid prices scaled by the average of bid and ask
prices.

Investment efficiency measures:
OINVEST:

The positive residuals from the investment model in the following
equation.

UINVEST:

The absolute value of negative residuals from the investment model
in the following equation:
INVESTi,t = α0 + β1SGi,t-1 + β2NEGi,t-1 + β3SG*NEGi,t-1 + εi,t
where SG is net sales growth (data12) in year t-1, NEG is an
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if SG is negative, and 0
otherwise. Equation (2) is estimated by two-digit SIC code and fiscal
year.

ROA:

Earnings before extraordinary items (data18) scaled by lagged assets
(data6) (in %).

ROE:

Earnings before extraordinary items (data18) scaled by lagged book
value of equity (data60) (in %).

CFO:

Cash flow from operations (data308) scaled by lagged assets (data6)
(in %).
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ATO:

Asset turnover measured as sales revenue divided by total assets
(data6) (in %).

SG:

Net sales growth (data12) (in %).

Other variables:
Q:

The ratio of the market value of total assets (data6 - (data 25*data
199) - data60 - data 74) to book value of total assets (data 6).

RET:

Cumulative raw returns over the three years t+1, t+2, and t+3.

CF:

The sum of net income before extraordinary items (data18),
depreciation and amortization expense (data14) and R&D expense
(data46), scaled by lagged assets(data6).

Slack:

The ratio of cash (data1) to PPE (data8).

Leverage:

The ratio of the sum of short-term debt (data34) and long-term debt
(data9) to total assets (data6).

Tangibility:

The ratio of PPE (data8) to total assets (data6).

K-Structure:

The ratio of long-term debt (data9) to the sum of long-term debt and
the market value of equity (data9+data 25*data199).

Dividend:

An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pays a dividend
(data21 or data127), and 0 otherwise.

Age:

The number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP.

Sales:

Total sales revenues (data12) scaled by lagged assets (data6) (in %).

Hindex:

The Herfindahl index of sales (data12), based on firm segment
reports. Industries are defined at the three-digit SIC code level.

KZ:

The Kaplan-Zingales index, measured as -1.002Cashflow - 39.368
Dividends - 1.315Cash + 3.139 Leverage.
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FIGURE 1
Tobin’s Q, Corporate Investment, and Future ROA by Year
25
ROA across the three Q
terciles (low to high):

4.1%, 2.1% and 1.3%
Correlation (Q, Investment):
1975-1990: 0.255
1991-2009: 0.561
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This figure plots the average values of Tobin’s Q (solid line), corporate investment (square dotted line) and the median values of future ROA (round dotted line)
over the years 1975 through 2009. The sample is based on all firms in Compustat with a book value of equity greater than $10 million. Tobin’s Q is measured as
the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets at the beginning of year t. Investment is the change in book value of assets(in %) in
year t. ROA is the average return on assets (in %) over the three years t+1 to t+3. Q (ROA) is multiplied by 8(3) for scaling in the figure. Detailed definitions of
all the variables used in this paper are provided in the Appendix.

46

FIGURE 2
Relations among Earnings smoothness, Stock Prices, and Corporate Investment
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This figure presents the relations among earnings smoothness, corporate investment, and stock prices. Stock prices affect corporate investment directly through
the “catering” channel and indirectly through the equity financing channel. Earnings smoothness reduces the impact of stock prices on corporate investment and
equity financing. This effect in turn enhances investment efficiency measured by over- (under-) investment and future operating performance.
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FIGURE 3
Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices across Earnings Smoothness Groups
Panel A
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This figure presents investment sensitivity to Q in Panel A and investment sensitivity to RET in Panel B across the three earnings smoothness groups. Investment
sensitivity to Q (RET) is the coefficient β1 (β2) from the following equations estimated separately for the three earnings smoothness groups.
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2CFi,t + β3LogAsseti,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
INVESTi,t = α + β2RETi,t+3 + β2CFi,t + β3LogAsseti,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
where INVEST is the percent change in book assets scaled by lagged book assets in year t. SMTH is earnings smoothness, measured as the ratio of the standard
deviation of cash flows to the standard deviation of earnings over the five years t-5 to t-1. Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of total assets to the
book value of total assets at the beginning of year t. CF is the cash flow in year t, measured as the sum of net income before extraordinary item, depreciation and
amortization expense, and R&D expense scaled by lagged assets. RET is the cumulative raw returns over the three years t+1, t+2, and t+3. LogAsset is the log
value of book assets at the beginning of year t.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Variables Used for Hypotheses Testing
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
INVEST (%)
EISU (%)
DISU (%)
SMTH
ISMTH
DSMTH
Q
RET
CF
LogAsset
STDCFO
STDRET
SPREAD

n
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,234
32,048
32,048

Mean
13.83
0.87
2.06
1.90
2.94
0.87
1.86
0.44
0.13
6.14
0.06
0.03
0.02

S.D.
33.37
13.45
11.57
1.96
17.86
13.45
1.41
0.81
0.12
1.92
0.05
0.02
0.01

P5
-19.58
-10.92
-10.33
0.34
-13.71
-10.91
0.79
-0.85
-0.05
3.38
0.01
0.01
0.01
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P25
-1.53
-2.66
-2.30
0.77
-4.81
-2.65
1.07
-0.01
0.06
4.65
0.03
0.02
0.01

P50
6.87
-0.28
0.00
1.26
-0.49
-0.28
1.40
0.41
0.11
5.92
0.05
0.03
0.02

P75
19.21
0.72
3.28
2.22
4.36
0.71
2.08
0.86
0.18
7.43
0.08
0.04
0.03

P95
69.87
16.31
21.61
5.73
34.50
16.31
4.55
1.88
0.34
9.66
0.17
0.07
0.04

Panel B: Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Above (Below) the Diagonal
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

INVEST
EISU
DISU
SMTH
ISMTH
DSMTH
Q
RET
CF
LogAsset
STDCFO
STDRET
SPREAD

0.20
0.41
0.09
0.10
0.01
0.33
-0.09
0.47
-0.03
0.03
-0.07
-0.05

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

0.46

0.51
0.01

0.02
-0.09
0.03

0.03
-0.13
0.03
0.55

-0.01
0.02
0.00
0.54
-0.26

0.31
0.20
0.08
-0.06
-0.01
-0.05

-0.10
-0.03
-0.06
-0.03
-0.03
0.00
-0.07

0.38
-0.03
0.05
0.01
0.06
-0.05
0.39
-0.02

-0.07
-0.22
-0.01
0.06
0.11
-0.04
-0.05
-0.08
-0.01

0.08
0.22
0.01
0.07
0.04
0.03
0.22
0.04
0.01
-0.39

0.00
0.25
-0.06
-0.22
-0.24
-0.02
0.09
0.18
-0.10
-0.49
0.44

0.00
0.26
-0.05
-0.23
-0.24
-0.02
0.12
0.15
-0.09
-0.48
0.45
0.92

-0.08
-0.13
-0.17
0.03
0.01
0.02
-0.09
-0.31
0.31
0.45
0.45

0.06
0.06
0.01
0.11
-0.06
0.04
0.03
-0.04
-0.10
-0.09

0.55
0.54
-0.06
-0.02
0.00
0.07
0.13
-0.22
-0.22

-0.26
-0.01
-0.02
0.04
0.12
0.04
-0.24
-0.23

-0.06
0.00
-0.04
-0.03
0.09
-0.02
-0.03

-0.11
0.50
0.03
0.14
-0.03
0.04

-0.02
-0.07
0.05
0.15
0.12

-0.02
0.06
-0.07
-0.05

-0.47
-0.54
-0.51

0.52
0.51

0.93

Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used for hypothesis testing and Panel B presents correlations among these variables. INVEST is the
percentage change in book assets scaled by lagged book assets. EISU is the net cash proceeds from the issuance and/or purchase of common and preferred stock
less cash dividends paid. DISU is the net cash proceeds from the issuance and/or repayment of debt. SMTH is earnings smoothness, measured as the ratio of the
standard deviation of cash flows to the standard deviation of earnings over the five years t-5 to t-1. ISMTH is the innate component of earnings smoothness.
DSMTH is the discretionary component of earnings smoothness. SMTH, DSMTH, and ISMTH are ranked into deciles by year in Panel B. Q is measured as the
ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets. CF is cash flows, measured as the sum of net income before extraordinary items,
depreciation and amortization expense, and R&D expense scaled by lagged assets. RET is the cumulative raw returns over the three years t+1, t+2, and t+3.
LogAsset is the log value of total assets. STDCFO is the standard deviation of cash flows over the five years t-5 to t-1. STDRET is the standard deviation of
daily stock returns. SPREAD is the average daily bid-ask spread, measured as the difference between ask and bid price scaled by the average of bid and ask price.
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TABLE 2
Earnings Smoothness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3RETi,t+3 + β4SMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β5CFi,t
+ β6LogAsseti,t-1 + β7SMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum +∑ IndDum + εi,t
INVEST

Expected Sign

Q

(+)

SMTH*Q

(-)

RET

(-)

Column 1

Column 2

4.892*

6.601*

(14.98)

(12.19)

-0.429*
(-4.67)

SMTH*RET

-3.430*

-4.641*

(-12.31)

(-9.64)

(+)

0.292*
(3.44)

88.482*

89.498*

(31.40)

(31.91)

-1.686*

-1.643*

(-13.20)

(-12.90)

0.198*

0.843*

(2.81)

(5.07)

Observations

32,234

32,234

R2

21.31%

21.59%

CF
LogAsset
SMTH

(+)
(-)
(?)

This table reports regression results of the effect of earnings smoothness on investment sensitivity to stock
prices. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated based on
standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 3
Innate and Discretionary Earnings Smoothness and Investment Sensitivity to
Stock Prices
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2ISMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3DSMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β4RETi,t+3 +
β5ISMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β6DSMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β7CFi,t + β8LogAsseti,t-1 +
β9ISMTHi,t-1 + β10DSMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
INVEST

Expected Sign
Q
ISMTH*Q

(+)

Column 1

Column 2

4.904*

8.377*

(15.02)

(10.78)

(-)

-0.684*
(-6.49)

DSMTH*Q

(-)

-0.124
(-1.35)

RET
ISMTH*RET

(-)

-3.435*

-5.33*

(-12.34)

(-7.65)

(+)

0.166**
(1.92)

DSMTH*RET

(+)

0.278*
(3.23)

CF
LogAsset
ISMTH
DSMTH

(+)
(-)
(?)
(?)

Observations
2

R

88.984*

91.418*

(31.45)

(32.46)

-1.670*

-1.570*

(-13.18)

(-12.47)

0.034

1.176*

(0.42)

(6.32)

0.238*

0.334**

(3.71)

(2.02)

32,234

32,234

21.32%

21.89%

This table reports regression results of the effect of innate and discretionary earnings smoothness on
investment sensitivity to stock prices. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses
and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 4
Firm Operating Environments and Relation between Earnings Smoothness and
Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2HIGHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β4SMTHi,t-1
*HIGH*Qi,t-1 + β5RETi,t+3 + β6HIGH i,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β7SMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 +
β8SMTHi,t-1*HIGHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β9CFi,t + β10LogAsseti,t-1 + β11SMTHi,t-1 +
β12HIGHi,t-1 + β13SMTHi,t-1*HIGHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
Exp.
Sign
Q
HIGH*Q
SMTH*Q
SMTH*HIGH*Q
RET
HIGH*RET
SMTH*RET
SMTH*HIGH*RET
CF
LogAsset
SMTH
HIGH
SMTH*HIGH

Observations
R2

(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(?)
(?)
(?)

STDCFO
Column 1

HIGH =
STDRET
Column 2

SPREAD
Column 3

2.543*

1.729**

1.401**

(4.11)

(2.39)

(2.13)

6.330*

5.779*

6.223*

(6.98)

(6.14)

(6.96)

-0.011

-0.102

-0.029

(-0.11)

(-0.97)

(-0.29)

-0.728*

-0.255

-0.412*

(-4.50)

(-1.56)

(-2.65)

-3.252*

-2.333*

-2.053**

(-5.73)

(-3.00)

(-2.65)

-2.525*

-2.692*

-3.189*

(-2.82)

(-2.83)

(-3.36)

0.123

0.024

-0.041

(1.03)

(0.18)

(-0.32)

0.305***

0.259

0.365**

(1.81)

(1.52)

(2.13)

91.399*

93.173*

93.155*

(33.1)

(33.45)

(33.02)

-1.523*

-1.397*

-1.307*

(-11.79)

(-10.56)

(-9.79)

0.126

0.300

0.242

(0.67)

(1.60)

(1.37)

-11.300*

-9.056*

-8.734*

(-6.33)

(-5.29)

(-5.37)

1.436*

0.601**

0.797*

(4.62)

(2.01)

(2.76)

32,155
22.30%

32,048
22.50%

32,048
22.46%
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This table reports regression results of cross-sectional variation in the effect of earnings smoothness on
investment sensitivity to stock prices. HIGH is an indicator variables coded as 1 if the corresponding proxy
(i.e., STDCFO, STDRET, and SPREAD) for operating environment volatility/uncertainty is above the
median in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in
parentheses and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects
are included. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed
test).
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TABLE 5
Earnings Smoothness and External Financing Sensitivity to Stock Prices
ISUi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3RETi,t+3 + β4SMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 + β5CFi,t
+ β6LogAsseti,t-1 + β7SMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
Exp.
Sign
Q
SMTH*Q
RET
SMTH*RET
CF
LogAsset
SMTH

Observations
2

R

(+)

EISU
Column 1

Column 2

2.085*

3.087*

0.685*

0.880*

(11.99)

(10.20)

(8.73)

6.58

(-)
(-)

(-)
(?)

Column 3

Column 4

-0.251*

-0.049**

(-4.54)

(-2.11)

-0.907*

-1.270*

-0.637*

-0.717*

(-7.64)

(-6.30)

(-6.44)

(-4.31)

(+)
(-)

DISU

0.087*

0.019

(2.54)

(0.61)

-13.682*

-13.091*

1.671**

1.786**

(-8.67)

(-8.33)

(2.09)

(2.25)

-1.584*

-1.559*

-0.159*

-0.155*

(-22.93)

(-22.70)

(-4.73)

(-4.58)

-0.238*

0.178***

0.140*

0.220*

(-7.87)

(1.88)

(5.95)

(4.47)

32,234

32,234

32,234

32,234

12.64%

13.17%

3.50%

3.52%

This table reports regression results of the effect of earnings smoothness on external financing sensitivity to
stock prices. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated based on
standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 6
Earnings Smoothness and Deviations from Expected Investment
OINVEST (UINVEST)i,t = α + β1SMTHi,t-1 + β2LogAsseti,t-1 + β3Slacki,t-1 +
β4Leveragei,t-1 + β5Tangibilityi,t-1 + β6K-structurei,t-1 + β7Dividendi,t-1 +
β8Agei,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t
Expected
Sign

OINVEST
Column 1

SMTH
LogAsset
Slack
Leverage
Tangibility
K-Structure

(-/-)

Column 2

UINVEST
Column 3

Column 4

-0.613*

-0.450*

-0.439*

-0.350*

(-6.24)

(-4.64)

(-14.79)

(-12.19)

(-/-)
(+/-)
(-/+)
(-/-)
(-/+)

-1.247*

-0.339*

(-6.29)

(-6.14)

0.115**

0.100*

(2.08)

(5.49)

10.709*

-0.365

(3.36)

(-0.37)

-5.829*

-5.688*

(-3.11)

(-9.72)

-13.585*

3.234*

(-5.37)

(4.26)

-1.584*

Dividend

(-/-)

-3.009*
(-4.20)

(-7.87)

Age

(-/-)

-0.144*

-0.039*

(-7.59)

(-7.31)

Observations
2

R

18,046

18,046

28,447

28,447

6.91%

8.90%

9.61%

12.31%

This table reports regression results of the effect of earnings smoothness on over- and under-investment.
Dependent variable is over-investment (OINVEST) in columns 1 and 2 and under-investment (UINVEST) in
columns 3 and 4. OINVEST and UINVEST are unexpected investment estimated from a model of
investment as a function of sales growth. SMTH and LogAsset are defined in Table 1. Slack is the ratio of
cash to PPE. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets. Tangibility is
the ratio of PPE to total assets. K-structure is the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and
the market value of equity. Dividend is an indicator variables taking value of 1 if firm pays dividend, and 0
otherwise. Age is the number of years since the firm first appears on CRSP. t-statistics are in parentheses
and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 7
Earnings Smoothness and Future Operating Performance
Performancei,t+3 = α + β1SMTHi,t-1 + β2Salesi,t-1 + β3Qi,t-1 + β4LogAsseti,t-1 + β5Agei,t-1 +
β6Leveragei,t-1 + β7Hindexi,t-1 + ∑YearDum + ∑IndDum + εi,t+3

SMTH
Sales
Q
LogAsset

Exp.
Sign
(+)
(+)
(?)
(?)

ROA
0.405*

ROE
0.945*

CFO
0.292*

ATO
0.362*

SG
0.116*

(11.85)

(6.88)

(9.75)

(3.71)

(2.03)

3.738*

7.002*

3.163*

90.375*

-4.390*

(15.58)

(9.07)

(13.73

(101.02)

(-13.89)

0.299*

0.237

0.445*

-0.940*

1.093*

(2.79)

(0.63)

(4.89)

(-6.34)

(6.97)

1.469*

3.959*

1.418*

-0.700*

-0.712*

(16.86)

(13.75)

(18.29)

(-3.68)

(-6.19)

0.128*

0.003

-0.106*

-0.095*

Age

(?)

0.030*
(4.11)

(4.20)

(0.49)

(-5.64)

(-8.72)

Leverage

(?)

-1.802*

7.652*

-0.547

2.881

-1.630

(-2.64)

(2.55)

(-0.87)

(1.53)

(-1.36)

1.042

2.603

-0.409

1.417

-5.686*

(1.17)

(0.79)

(-0.50)

(0.51)

(-4.30)

31,254

31,252

31,235

31,254

31,244

15.10%

5.58%

19.07%

83.66%

9.77%

Hindex

Observation
2

R

(?)

This table reports regression results of the effect of earnings smoothness on future operating performance.
ROA is return on asset, measured as earnings divided by lagged assets. ROE is return on equity, measured
as earnings divided by owner’s equity. CFO is cash flows from operations, measured as cash flows scaled
by lagged assets. ATO is asset turnover, measured as sales divided by assets. SG is sales growth. All
performance measures are the average performance over the three years t+1, t+2, and t+3. Sales is net sales.
Age is the number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio.
Hindex is the Herfindahl index of sales based on firms’ segment reports where industries are defined at the
three-digit SIC code level. SMTH, Q, and LogAsset are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses
and are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 8
Earnings Smoothing and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices –
Alternative Measures of Investment
INVESTi,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3RETi,t+3 + β4SMTHi,t-1*RETi,t+3 +
β5CFi,t + β6LogAsseti,t-1 + β7SMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum +∑ IndDum + εi,t

Expected
Sign
+

INVESTALT
2.322*

CAPXRND
1.803*

CAPX
0.357*

(11.80)

(8.77)

(3.71)

-0.094*

-0.295*

-0.030

(-2.84)

(-3.28)

(1.06)

-0.136

0.294

-0.374*

(-0.68)

(1.50)

(-2.76)

0.029

0.036

0.001

(1.57)

(1.63)

(0.05)

30.038*

18.822*

11.443*

(23.90)

(8.56)

(6.97)

-0.915*

-0.768*

-0.233*

(-14.42)

(-11.19)

(-3.38)

0.023

0.034

0.103*

(0.36)

(0.57)

(2.61)

Observations

32,234

32,234

32,234

R2

22.59%

39.52%

36.07%

Q
SMTH*Q
RET
SMTH*RET
CF
LogAsset
SMTH

+
+
?

This table reports regression results of the effect of earnings smoothness on investment sensitivity to
stock prices. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated based
on standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 9
Earnings Smoothing and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Prices –
Abnormal Investment
OINVEST(UINVEST)i,t = α + β1Qi,t-1 + β2SMTHi,t-1*Qi,t-1 + β3RETi,t+3 + β4SMTHi,t1*RETi,t+3 + β5CFi,t + β6LogAsseti,t-1 + β7SMTHi,t-1 + ∑YearDum +∑ IndDum +
εi,t

Q
SMTH*Q
RET
SMTH*RET
CF
LogAsset
SMTH

Expected
Sign
(+/?)
(-/?)

OINVEST
3.333*

UINVEST
0.872*

(5.59)

(5.43)

-0.312*

0.005

(-3.56)

(0.13)

-5.873*

0.975*

(-4.46)

(4.22)

(?/-)

0.275***

-0.100**

(1.78)

(-2.18)

+

33.976*

-35.913*

(3.02)

(-14.62)

-3.149*

-0.335*

(-4.30)

(-5.18)

-0.009

-0.163

(-0.03)

(-2.01)

32,234

32,234

18.66%

24.30%

(?/+)

?

Observations
2

R

This table reports regression results of the effect of earnings smoothness on investment sensitivity to
stock prices. All variables are defined in Table 1. t-statistics are in parentheses and are calculated based
on standard errors clustered by firm. Year and industry fixed effects are included. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
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